Appeasement Pack - Core Reader

Appeasement Pack

How far was the policy of appeasement justified?

 

How far was the policy of appeasement justified?

Chamberlain on Hitler

“In spite of the hardness and ruthlessness of his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon.”

Historian Norman Davies

“Chamberlain’s three rounds with Hitler must qualify as one of the most degrading capitulations in history.”

Winston Churchill on the Munich Agreement.

 “England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war.”

After the Austrian Anschluss, Hitler was beginning to feel that he could not put a foot wrong.  But his growing confidence was putting the peace of Europe in increasing danger…

Explore:

A superb watch: Part of the 'Summits' series by Professor David Reynolds (BBC 4), this outstanding documentary covers the crisis of 1938 in superb detail.

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ztU3KsseBRs

 1.28 long!

Consider:

The five most important reasons as to why the British government appeased Hitler:

1.    Some British people approved of Hitler's policies.

2.    The British people hoped that a strong Germany would stop the growth of Communist Russia.

3.    Many people felt that events in Europe were not Britain's business.

4.    Many British people wanted peace.

5.    Many British people agreed with Hitler that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair.

Talking Point: How far was the policy of appeasement justified?

The Sudetenland, 1938

The Sudetenland and the Munich Agreement- A condensed version

   

On 11 March 1938, Hitler invaded Austria.   It was clear he wanted to do the same in the Sudetenland.  

     

On 7 September 1938, the German Sudeten Party demanded union with Germany.  

	There were riots.
	German newsreels showed ‘evidence’ of Czech ‘atrocities’ against the Sudeten Germans.
	Hitler threatened to support the Sudeten Germans with military force.

 

Then Chamberlain intervened.  

1.    Chamberlain met Hitler at Berchtesgaden

       (15 September).

	Hitler promised him that this was the ‘last problem to be solved’.
	Chamberlain decided Hitler was ‘a man who can be relied upon’.
	He persuaded the Czechs to hand over the Sudetenland.

2.    Chamberlain met Hitler at Bad Godesberg

       (22 September.)  

	Hitler made more demands.
	At first Chamberlain refused, but then he decided that Czechoslovakia was not one of the ‘great issues’ which justified war, but just ‘a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing’.

3.    Britain and France met Hitler again and made a Pact with him at Munich (29 September).   This was known as the MUNICH AGREEMENT.

They gave the Sudetenland to Germany.

 

On 30 September, Chamberlain returned to England with his famous piece of paper.   ‘I believe it is peace for our time’, he told the cheering crowd. 

 

Czechoslovakia was not even invited to the talks.   The Czechs were free to fight if they wished, but they had no support.   They chose not to fight.  

 

On 1 October 1938, Hitler marched unopposed into the Sudetenland.   He said that it was the start of a 1000-year German Reich (empire).  

Appeasement Collapses

“How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.”  

Chamberlain, speaking in a radio broadcast about the Sudetenland crisis, 27 September 1938.

War

The radio broadcast where (for the first time) British PM Neville Chamberlain announces to the nation that a state of war now exists between Britain and Germany, following the invasion of Poland.

Here is the original broadcast to the nation, from Chamberlain, at 11.15 on 3^rd September, 1939:

 http://www.otr.com/ra/news/neville.mp3

Thirsty for more? Look at this Superb site: http://www.otr.com/munich.html

For those with a back garden (middle and upper classes only!) The Manchester Guardian published this rather hopeful guide to create your own trench:

Whilst in London (St James Park):

The Munich Agreement

Unlike the leaders of Britain and France, Edward Benes, the leader of Czechoslovakia, was horrified by the Anschluss.  He realised that Czechoslovakia would be the next country on Hitler’s list for takeover.  It seemed that Britain and France were not prepared to stand up to Hitler.  Benes sought guarantees from the British and the French that they would honour their commitment to defend Czechoslovakia if Hitler invaded.  The French were bound by a treaty and reluctantly said they would.  The British felt bound to support the French.  However, Chamberlain asked Hitler whether had had designs on Czechoslovakia and was reassured by Hitler’s promise that Czechoslovakia had nothing to fear.

Despite what he said to Chamberlain, Hitler did have designs on Czechoslovakia.  This new state, created by the Treaty of Versailles, included a large number of Germans – former subjects of the Austria-Hungary Empire – in the Sudetenland.  Henlein, who was the leader of the Nazis in the Sudetenland, stirred up trouble among the Sudetenland Germans and they demanded to be part of Germany.  In May 1938, Hitler made it clear that he intended to fight Czechoslovakia if necessary.  Historians disagree as to whether Hitler really meant what he said.  There is considerable evidence that the German army was not at all ready for war.  Even so the news put Europe on full war alert.

Unlike Austria, Czechoslovakia would be no walk-over for Hitler.  Britain, France and the USSR had all promised to support Czechoslovakia if it came to war.  The Czechs themselves had a modern army.  The Czechoslovak leader, Benes, was prepared to fight.  He knew that without the Sudetenland and its forts, railways and industries, Czechoslovakia would be defenceless.  All through the summer the tension rose in Europe.  If there was a war, people expected that it would bring heavy bombing of civilians as had happened in the Spanish Civil War, and in cities around Britain councils began digging air-raid shelters.  Magazines carried advertisements for air-raid protection and gas masks.

In September the problem reached a crisis point.  In a last-ditch effort to avert war, Chamberlain flew to meet Hitler on 15^th September.  The meeting appeared to go well.  Hitler moderated his demands, saying he was only interested in parts of the Sudetenland – and then only if a plebiscite showed that the Sudeten Germans wanted to join Germany. Chamberlain thought this was reasonable.  He felt it was yet another of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that needed to be addressed.  Chamberlain seemed convinced that, if Hitler got what he wanted, he would at last be satisfied.

On 19^th September the French and the British put to the Czechs their plans to give Hitler the parts of the Sudetenland that he wanted.  However, three days later at a second meeting, Hitler increased his demands.  He said he ‘regretted’ that the previously arranged terms were not enough.  He wanted all the Sudetenland.

To justify his demands, he claimed that the Czech government was mistreating the Germans in the Sudetenland and that he intended to ‘rescue’ them by 1^st October.  Chamberlain told Hitler that his demands were unreasonable.  The British navy was mobilised.  War seemed imminent.

With Mussolini’s help, a final meeting was held in Munich on 29^th September.  While Europe held its breath, the leaders of Britain, Germany, France and Italy decided on the fate of Czechoslovakia.  On 29^th September, the decided to give Hitler what he wanted. 

They announced that Czechoslovakia was to lose the Sudetenland.   They did not consult the Czechs, nor did they consult the USSR.  This is known as the Munich Agreement.  The following morning, Chamberlain and Hitler published a joint declaration which Chamberlain said would bring ‘peace for our time’.

Click on image below for original news broadcast:

Hitler had gambled that the British would not risk war.  He spoke of the Munich Agreement as ‘an undreamt of triumph, so great that you can scarcely imagine it’.  The prize of the Sudetenland had been given to him without a shot being fired.  On 1^st October, German troops marched into the Sudetenland.  At the same time, Hungary and Poland helped themselves to Czech territory where Hungarians and Poles were living.  The Czechs had been betrayed.  Benes resigned.  But the rest of Europe breathed a sigh of relief.  Chamberlain received a hero’s welcome back in Britain, when he returned with the ‘piece of paper’ – the Agreement – signed by Hitler.

Background Information: How Far Was Appeasement Justified?

1. Economic: Europe was still recovering from the effects of the Wall Street Crash. It was thought that a strong, prosperous Germany could help other European economies via trade. With three million British people unemployed, the government had to spend money on social welfare rather than weapons and soldiers. Chamberlain wanted to increase the amount of money used for social welfare, so was reluctant to increase military spending which had been reduced in 1919 and again in 1928.
2. Paris peace settlement: Feelings expressed by Lord Lothian during the Rhineland crisis that Germany was "only going into their own back garden" had support. Popular opinion in Britain was that Germany had been punished too heavily by the Treaty of Versailles. Paying reparations to the nations it had invaded had crippled the German economy. Before the outbreak of war, many people in Britain admired Hitler. Many people thought Hitler's demands were justified as many of the territories he wanted to control had German-speaking populations.
3. Public opinion: After the Rhineland crisis Churchill warned war was more likely. He described the German occupation of the Rhineland as a menace to Holland, Belgium and France. Cartoonist David Low was critical of non-intervention however this was a minority view. Closer links between Germany and Austria were seen as inevitable. Some politicians held the view that Austria welcomed the Anschluss. Austria was German speaking, and had subsequently supported the Anschluss in a plebiscite. The Anschluss was not seen as a problem by most because it was linked to the unpopular Versailles Settlement. Some concern over the immediate persecution of Austrian Jews was reported in the press. In November 1938, journalist Vernon Bartlett won the by-election in Bridgwater, Somerset, as an anti-Chamberlain candidate in a traditionally “safe” Conservative seat- a blow to the government and Chamberlain.
4. Pacifism: The Oxford Union voted by 257 votes to 153 that "this house will in no circumstances fight for King and Country" in February 1933. This was shocking at the time and it was interpreted as a sign that the ruling classes had been converted to pacifism! In 1934 a house to house survey carried out across the whole country by the League of Nations Union had 11.5 million replies. The response was overwhelming support for the principle of collective security through the League of Nations.
5. Empire: Any war in Europe involving Britain could threaten the security of her Empire. During the 1930s Britain's empire had come under threat from Japan and Italy. There had been trouble in India, the Middle East and in Ireland. In 1938 several countries in the British Empire, including Canada and South Africa said they would not go to war in support of Britain should war break out with Germany over Czechoslovakia.
6. Lack of reliable allies: France at this time was politically divided. France had only a static defence policy based on the Maginot line and would be unlikely to assist any attempt to oust Germany from the Rhineland. The USA was in isolation and wanted nothing to do with Europe. At the time of Anschluss, Britain had no allies in the area around Austria. There were question marks over France's ability to be an effective ally. The country was politically unstable during the 1930s with violent clashes in the streets between supporters of right and left wing parties. The League of Nations, established after WWI to help prevent future conflicts, had proved ineffective.
7. Military: The Government was concerned with the weakness of its armed forces, notably the lack of home defences, especially against the bomber. There had been widespread disarmament in the 1920s; there were no troops immediately available to mount a challenge. The heads of Britain's armed forces consistently warned Chamberlain that Britain was too weak to fight. Alongside this Nazi propaganda encouraged Britain and France to believe that Germany’s forces were a lot stronger than they really were. Hitler claimed the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was to strengthen Germany's defences. Germany had rearmed in 1935 - this led to the view that it was perhaps too late to resist the breaking of the Treaty of Versailles. At the time of the Anschluss, Chiefs of Staff warned that fighting Hitler might encourage Italy and Japan to take advantage of Britain's overstretched and under-resourced overseas commitments. Some argue the Munich agreement of September 1938 gave Britain valuable time to bolster its defences and significantly increase its military capabilities before declaring war on 3^rd September 1939. The number of British aircraft rose from 3,000 to 8,000 by 1939 and the army went from around 200,000 to 683,000.
8. Communism: Many British politicians regarded Communism as a greater threat than Nazi Germany. Their view was reinforced by the show trials in Stalin's Soviet Union. A common saying was "better Hitlerism than Communism". In Britain during most of the 1930s, the Conservative party was in power. They believed Communism was a far greater threat to world peace than Hitler and that Germany could be a defence against possible Soviet plans to invade Europe. A small minority of communist sympathisers believed an alliance with Stalin was vital. Appeasement scared the USSR. Stalin’s ultimate reaction to British and French appeasement was to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939 - a temporary agreement between ideological enemies which included a secret deal to split Poland between them in the near future. Chamberlain declared war following the invasion of Poland on 3^rd September 1939.
9. Chamberlain: Appeasement was based on the idea that Hitler was trustworthy. Chamberlain believed he made extreme statements to gain publicity and was actually a reasonable man who would choose negotiation rather than conflict. Several British politicians were very impressed by Hitler. The former PM Lloyd George, who met Hitler in 1936 returned to Britain to describe him as a man of “supreme quality”. The Labour MP and former party leader George Lansbury, who was a pacifist, wrote in 1937 that Hitler ‘would not go to war unless other people pushed him into it’. Anthony Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1938 criticising Chamberlain’s policy. Critics also pointed out that the Czech army, one of the best in Europe, had been lost to Germany. Chamberlain was viewed as naïve. Churchill, his successor, re-enforced this view through his own history of the war and a very popular book was written criticising him in 1940 called The Guilty Men. This negative view was first challenged in the 1960s by historian A.J.P. Taylor.
10.  Hitler’s Plans: Hitler’s failed Beer Hall Putsch in Munich 1923 and his subsequent imprisonment afforded him the time to write about Aryan superiority and the need for Lebensraum ('living space' for the expanding Germany) in Eastern Europe and Russia in Mein Kampf. The intention to abolish the Treaty of Versailles, rearmament, remilitarisation of the Rhineland and Anschluss were clear. Churchill called the Anschluss "a programme of aggression, nicely calculated and timed" and was not the only one to suggest Hitler's aim was aggressive territorial expansion with a willingness to engage in war. Appeasement arguably encouraged Hitler to be more aggressive and to take bigger risks.

Sources

1. Adolf Hitler, Speech to Reichstag after the re-militarisation of the Rhineland (7th March 1936)

"First, we swear to yield to no force whatever in the restoration of the honour of our people, preferring to succumb with honour to the severest hardships rather than to capitulate. Secondly, we pledge that now, more than ever, we shall strive for an understanding between European peoples, especially for one with our Western neighbour nations. We have no territorial demands to make in Europe! Germany will never break the peace."

2. Herbert Morrison, An Autobiography (1960)

“I believe that in 1938 and 1939 he (Chamberlain) genuinely felt that God had sent him into this world to obtain peace. That he failed may or may not be due to the inevitable ambition of Hitler to dominate the world, but there can be little doubt that in his mental attitude Chamberlain went the wrong way about it. He decided in the early stages of his discussions to treat Hitler as a normal human being and an important human being at that.”

3. Edward Heath, (Former Prime Minister) The Course of My Life (1988)

“At Oxford, on Thursday 13 October 1938, I proposed the motion 'That this House deplores the Government's policy of Peace without Honour'. The debate was a stormy one. Deriding the Munich Agreement as 'the peace which passeth all understanding', I attacked Chamberlain for a 'policy which brought us to the brink of war, and that points at we know not what future tragedies'. There was immense interest in the debate and we won by 320 votes to 266.”

4.  A.J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (1965)

“All the press welcomed the Munich agreement as preferable to war with the exception of Reynolds News, a Left-wing Socialist newspaper of small circulation (and, of course, the Communist Daily Worker). Duff Cooper, first lord of the admiralty, resigned and declared that Great Britain should have gone to war, not to save Czechoslovakia, but to prevent one country dominating the continent 'by brute force'. No one else took this line in the prolonged Commons debate (3rd-6th October). The overwhelming majority of ordinary people, according to contemporary estimates, approved of what Chamberlain had done.”

5. Vernon Bartlett was in Godesberg working for the Daily Chronicle on 22nd September 1938. He wrote about it in And Now, Tomorrow (1960)

“I am firmly convinced that, had Chamberlain stood firm at Godesberg, Hitler would either have climbed down or would have begun war with far less support from his own people than he had a year later. The British forces, one is told, were scandalously unprepared, and were able to make good some of their defects during that year. But meanwhile the Western Allies lost the Czechoslovak Army - one of the best on the Continent - defending a country from which the German armies could be out-flanked. Was it not Bismarck who claimed that whoever controlled Bohemia controlled Europe?”

6. General Ismay’s letter to the British Cabinet (September 20th, 1938)

“If war with Germany has to come it would be better to fight her in say six-twelve months’ time, than to accept the present challenge.”

7. The Manchester Guardian (17th March, 1939)

“Prague, a sorrowing Prague, yesterday had its first day of German rule - a day in which the Czechs learned of the details of their subjection to Germany, and in which the Germans began their measures against the Jews and against those people who have "opened their mouths too wide."

8. Winston Churchill, The Second World War (1948)

“For the French Government to leave her faithful ally Czechoslovakia to her fate was a lapse from which flowed terrible consequences. Great Britain, who would certainly have fought if bound by treaty obligations, was nevertheless now deeply involved, and it must be recorded with regret that the British Government not only acquiesced but encouraged the French Government in a fatal course.”

9. Joint statement from Chamberlain and Hitler (30th September, 1938)

“We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as Symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries.”

10. Henry Channon, diary entry (15th March, 1938)

“Hitler has entered Prague, apparently, and Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist. No balder, bolder departure from the written bond has ever been committed in history...His (Chamberlain’s) whole policy of appeasement is in ruins. Munich is a torn-up episode. Yet never has he been proved more abundantly right for he gave us six months of peace in which we re-armed, and he was right to try appeasement. I was relieved at how little personal criticism there was of the Apostle of Peace.”

11. Hugh Christie, report to MI6 (3rd February, 1937)

“I asked the General straight out, "What is Germany's aim in Europe today?" Goering replied, "We want a free hand in Eastern Europe. We want to establish the unity of the German peoples (Grossdeutschegemeinschaft)”. I said "Do you mean to get Austria?" Reply "Yes". I said "Do you mean to get Czechoslovakia?" Reply "Yes".

12. Anthony Eden, on why he resigned as Foreign Secretary (21st February, 1938)

“I do not believe that we can make progress in European appeasement if we allow the impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to constant pressure.”

13. William GallacherThe Chosen Few (1940)

“It is no exaggeration to say that many prominent representatives of the Conservative Party, speaking for powerful landed and financial interests in the country, would welcome Hitler and the German Army if they believed that such was the only alternative to the establishment of Socialism in this country.”