Background information from lesson

Background Information: How Far Was Appeasement Justified?

1. Economic: Europe was still recovering from the effects of the Wall Street Crash. It was thought that a strong, prosperous Germany could help other European economies via trade. With three million British people unemployed, the government had to spend money on social welfare rather than weapons and soldiers. Chamberlain wanted to increase the amount of money used for social welfare, so was reluctant to increase military spending which had been reduced in 1919 and again in 1928.
2. Paris peace settlement: Feelings expressed by Lord Lothian during the Rhineland crisis that Germany was "only going into their own back garden" had support. Popular opinion in Britain was that Germany had been punished too heavily by the Treaty of Versailles. Paying reparations to the nations it had invaded had crippled the German economy. Before the outbreak of war, many people in Britain admired Hitler. Many people thought Hitler's demands were justified as many of the territories he wanted to control had German-speaking populations.
3. Public opinion: After the Rhineland crisis Churchill warned war was more likely. He described the German occupation of the Rhineland as a menace to Holland, Belgium and France. Cartoonist David Low was critical of non-intervention however this was a minority view. Closer links between Germany and Austria were seen as inevitable. Some politicians held the view that Austria welcomed the Anschluss. Austria was German speaking, and had subsequently supported the Anschluss in a plebiscite. The Anschluss was not seen as a problem by most because it was linked to the unpopular Versailles Settlement. Some concern over the immediate persecution of Austrian Jews was reported in the press. In November 1938, journalist Vernon Bartlett won the by-election in Bridgwater, Somerset, as an anti-Chamberlain candidate in a traditionally “safe” Conservative seat- a blow to the government and Chamberlain.
4. Pacifism: The Oxford Union voted by 257 votes to 153 that "this house will in no circumstances fight for King and Country" in February 1933. This was shocking at the time and it was interpreted as a sign that the ruling classes had been converted to pacifism! In 1934 a house to house survey carried out across the whole country by the League of Nations Union had 11.5 million replies. The response was overwhelming support for the principle of collective security through the League of Nations.
5. Empire: Any war in Europe involving Britain could threaten the security of her Empire. During the 1930s Britain's empire had come under threat from Japan and Italy. There had been trouble in India, the Middle East and in Ireland. In 1938 several countries in the British Empire, including Canada and South Africa said they would not go to war in support of Britain should war break out with Germany over Czechoslovakia.
6. Lack of reliable allies: France at this time was politically divided. France had only a static defence policy based on the Maginot line and would be unlikely to assist any attempt to oust Germany from the Rhineland. The USA was in isolation and wanted nothing to do with Europe. At the time of Anschluss, Britain had no allies in the area around Austria. There were question marks over France's ability to be an effective ally. The country was politically unstable during the 1930s with violent clashes in the streets between supporters of right and left wing parties. The League of Nations, established after WWI to help prevent future conflicts, had proved ineffective.
7. Military: The Government was concerned with the weakness of its armed forces, notably the lack of home defences, especially against the bomber. There had been widespread disarmament in the 1920s; there were no troops immediately available to mount a challenge. The heads of Britain's armed forces consistently warned Chamberlain that Britain was too weak to fight. Alongside this Nazi propaganda encouraged Britain and France to believe that Germany’s forces were a lot stronger than they really were. Hitler claimed the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was to strengthen Germany's defences. Germany had rearmed in 1935 - this led to the view that it was perhaps too late to resist the breaking of the Treaty of Versailles. At the time of the Anschluss, Chiefs of Staff warned that fighting Hitler might encourage Italy and Japan to take advantage of Britain's overstretched and under-resourced overseas commitments. Some argue the Munich agreement of September 1938 gave Britain valuable time to bolster its defences and significantly increase its military capabilities before declaring war on 3^rd September 1939. The number of British aircraft rose from 3,000 to 8,000 by 1939 and the army went from around 200,000 to 683,000.
8. Communism: Many British politicians regarded Communism as a greater threat than Nazi Germany. Their view was reinforced by the show trials in Stalin's Soviet Union. A common saying was "better Hitlerism than Communism". In Britain during most of the 1930s, the Conservative party was in power. They believed Communism was a far greater threat to world peace than Hitler and that Germany could be a defence against possible Soviet plans to invade Europe. A small minority of communist sympathisers believed an alliance with Stalin was vital. Appeasement scared the USSR. Stalin’s ultimate reaction to British and French appeasement was to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939 - a temporary agreement between ideological enemies which included a secret deal to split Poland between them in the near future. Chamberlain declared war following the invasion of Poland on 3^rd September 1939.
9. Chamberlain: Appeasement was based on the idea that Hitler was trustworthy. Chamberlain believed he made extreme statements to gain publicity and was actually a reasonable man who would choose negotiation rather than conflict. Several British politicians were very impressed by Hitler. The former PM Lloyd George, who met Hitler in 1936 returned to Britain to describe him as a man of “supreme quality”. The Labour MP and former party leader George Lansbury, who was a pacifist, wrote in 1937 that Hitler ‘would not go to war unless other people pushed him into it’. Anthony Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1938 criticising Chamberlain’s policy. Critics also pointed out that the Czech army, one of the best in Europe, had been lost to Germany. Chamberlain was viewed as naïve. Churchill, his successor, re-enforced this view through his own history of the war and a very popular book was written criticising him in 1940 called The Guilty Men. This negative view was first challenged in the 1960s by historian A.J.P. Taylor.
10.  Hitler’s Plans: Hitler’s failed Beer Hall Putsch in Munich 1923 and his subsequent imprisonment afforded him the time to write about Aryan superiority and the need for Lebensraum ('living space' for the expanding Germany) in Eastern Europe and Russia in Mein Kampf. The intention to abolish the Treaty of Versailles, rearmament, remilitarisation of the Rhineland and Anschluss were clear. Churchill called the Anschluss "a programme of aggression, nicely calculated and timed" and was not the only one to suggest Hitler's aim was aggressive territorial expansion with a willingness to engage in war. Appeasement arguably encouraged Hitler to be more aggressive and to take bigger risks.